

Solidity Analysis of The Golkar Party in Jambi City in the 2024 Simultaneous Regional Head Elections

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ABSTRACT - The 2024 Simultaneous Regional Head Elections constitute a critical test of intra-party cohesion in Indonesia's increasingly competitive electoral landscape. This study examines the internal solidity of the *Golongan Karya* (Golkar) Party in Jambi City following internal conflict over the nomination of mayoral candidates. The dispute emerged from divergent preferences between the City Regional Leadership Council (DPD II), which endorsed internal cadres, and the Provincial and Central leadership (DPD I and DPP), which prioritized electability in selecting alternative candidates. Employing a qualitative case study design, this research draws on in-depth interviews with party officials, cadres, political observers, and academics, complemented by party documents and media reports. Data were analyzed using Miles and Huberman's interactive model. The study offers a novel contribution by conceptualizing party solidity as adaptive rather than fully institutionalized, demonstrating how centralized authority, charismatic leadership, and cadre loyalty function as stabilizing mechanisms in the aftermath of internal conflict. The findings highlight the urgency of strengthening institutionalized decision-making processes to ensure sustainable party cohesion, thereby contributing to broader debates on party institutionalization and democratic consolidation in Indonesia.

Keywords: *Party Solidity, Golkar Party, Regional Head Elections, Simultaneous Elections*

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Introduction

Regional Head Elections are a fundamental mechanism in Indonesian democracy, serving as a means of realizing people's sovereignty at the local level (Aminah, 2020). Regional Head Elections is not only understood as a procedural electoral process, but also reflects the quality of democracy, the political maturity of society, and the institutional capacity of political parties as key actors in the democratic system (Puspaningrum & Jumiati, 2025). In the modern democracy, political parties play a strategic role as a link between the interests of the people and state power through their functions of leadership recruitment, political education, articulation of interests, and conflict management (Diamond & Gunther, 2001; Spoon, 2012). The success of parties in carrying out these functions is largely determined by the level of institutionalization and internal solidity within the organization (Mainwaring, 2016). The 2024 Simultaneous Regional Elections are a crucial moment, as they will be held simultaneously in nearly all regions of Indonesia (Naharuddin & Imran, 2024; Noer Arfah et al., 2025; Ramadani et al., 2025). The scale of these elections places political parties in a strategic yet vulnerable position, as they must not only win the electoral contest but also maintain internal stability to avoid being divided by differences in interests between central and regional elites or between cadres (Aji & Indrawan, 2020; Budiatri, 2022; Hanafi, 2014; Widyana, 2022). Thus, the 2024 Regional Elections will be a real test of the organizational capacity and internal cohesion of political parties.

The Golkar Party, as one of the oldest parties in Indonesia, is recognized for its strong organizational structure and relatively high level of organizational discipline. However, Golkar's hierarchical and centralistic character also makes it prone to internal conflicts, particularly in the process of political recruitment and the selection of regional head candidates. This phenomenon is clearly reflected in the internal dynamics of Golkar in Jambi City ahead of the 2024 regional elections. Golkar's success in increasing its seats in the Jambi City DPRD from four to eight seats in the 2024 elections, under the leadership of Budi Setiawan, has strengthened cadres' expectations for the nomination of internal cadres as candidates for Mayor of Jambi.

Budi Setiawan, as the Chairman of the Golkar Party's Jambi City Chapter, is perceived to have strong political legitimacy to run as a candidate for mayor based on the support of the majority of the sub-district structures, the party's electoral performance, massive political activities, and competitive survey results. However, the decision of the DPD I and DPP Golkar to instead nominate the Maulana-Diza pair sparked disappointment and fairly open internal conflict, marked by cadre protests and demonstrations. This conflict reflects the tension between survey-based electoral rationality and regional cadre aspirations rooted in structural political work, while also highlighting the challenges of internal democratic practices within a centralized party.

Theoretically, Firman Noor (2015) asserts that party solidity is not measured by the absence of conflict, but rather by the party's ability to manage conflict institutionally and maintain organizational unity. In this context, the internal dynamics of Golkar in Jambi City provide an important analytical space to examine how party solidity is tested and maintained at the local level. Various previous studies have discussed political parties and regional elections from various perspectives. Muzwardi et al. (2024), Marpaung (2016), and Immanuel & Djuyandi (2024) emphasize campaign strategies, candidate figures, and political networks as factors in electoral victory, but have not examined internal party solidity. Primadi & Purwaningsih (2019), Ridha (2017), Ghofur & al Arif (2017), and Cumaedy & Sarofah (2019) show that elite dominance, weak institutionalization, and undemocratic recruitment practices have the potential to trigger internal

party conflicts. Meanwhile, Dewangga & Solihah (2023) show that Golkar's efforts to reform its cadre system have not been entirely consistent. Comparative studies by Anawati & Al-Hamdi (2020) and Subekti & Al-Hamdi (2024) confirm that organizational discipline, cadre compliance, and elite consensus are key to maintaining party solidity amid conflict.

Based on these studies, it can be concluded that research specifically focusing on internal party solidity in the context of local election conflicts is still relatively limited. Therefore, this study aims to analyze in depth the internal solidity of the Golkar Party in Jambi City in the lead-up to the 2024 Simultaneous Regional Elections, particularly in maintaining organizational unity, cadre loyalty, and structural stability following the conflict over regional head candidacy. So, this research formulates the question of how solidity the Golkar party in Jambi City is in facing the simultaneous regional elections in 2024. This study aims to enrich the literature on political parties and local democracy, providing empirical contributions to understanding strategies for managing internal conflicts within political parties in Indonesia.

Method

This study employs a qualitative method, utilizing a case study approach. The qualitative approach was chosen because it enables researchers to examine political phenomena in a contextual and in-depth manner, particularly regarding organizational behavior, power relations, and cadres' attitudes and perceptions of party decisions. The case study method was employed because this study focuses its analysis on a specific case: the internal conflict within the Golkar Party in Jambi City during the process of nominating candidates for mayor in the 2024 regional elections. This approach enables a comprehensive exploration of the internal dynamics of the party within the local context.

The study was conducted in Jambi City, with a focus on the Regional Leadership Council (DPD) II of the Golkar Party in Jambi City. This location was chosen based on the strategic position of DPD II as the main actor in the regional head candidate selection process and as the party directly affected by the decisions of DPD I and DPP Golkar Party. In addition, Jambi City, as the provincial capital, has intense local political dynamics, making it a relevant context for examining party solidity. The data sources in this study consist of primary and secondary data. Primary data was obtained through in-depth interviews with informants who were directly involved in the internal dynamics of the Golkar Party in Jambi City, including DPD II officials, DPD I officials, party cadres, as well as political observers and academics. Secondary data was obtained from official party documents such as the party constitution and bylaws, organizational implementation guidelines, internal meeting minutes, KPU data, as well as media reports and scientific literature relevant to the research topic.

Informants were selected using purposive sampling, which involves choosing informants based on specific criteria relevant to the research needs, particularly those who understand and are directly involved in the party's decision-making and internal conflict management processes. To enrich the data and broaden the perspective, snowball sampling was also used by requesting recommendations for additional informants from the initial informants. Data collection techniques were carried out through in-depth interviews and documentation. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, allowing researchers to obtain targeted data while providing informants with space to explain their views and experiences more freely. Documentation was used as

supporting data to reinforce the interview results, especially regarding party policies, conflict chronology, and organizational decisions.

Data analysis was conducted using Miles & Huberman, (1994) interactive analysis model, which involves data reduction, data presentation, and drawing conclusions. Data reduction was carried out by sorting and focusing on data relevant to the research problem formulation. The reduced data was then presented in the form of analytical narratives to facilitate researchers' ability to identify patterns and relationships between concepts. The final stage was drawing conclusions, which was done gradually and verified repeatedly to ensure the consistency and accuracy of the analysis results. To ensure data validity, this study used source triangulation techniques. Data obtained from one informant were compared with data from other informants, official documents, and media sources, ensuring that the information used in the analysis accurately reflected the empirical conditions in the field.

Result and Discussion

Procedural Leadership: Decision-Making Process and The Role of Charismatic Figures

The results of this study indicate that the decision-making process for the 2024 Jambi mayoral candidacy in the Golkar Party was carried out through a hierarchical and procedural organizational mechanism, but with a centralistic character at the final stage of determination. Formally, candidate selection is carried out at the neighborhood leadership and sub-district leadership levels, then discussed and decided in a plenary meeting of the Regional Leadership Council (DPD) II before being submitted to the DPD I and then to the Central Leadership Council (DPP). This mechanism aligns with the provisions of Chapter IX, Article 19, paragraph (1) of the Golkar party constitution and bylaws, which stipulates that the DPP is the sole authority for final decisions on regional head candidates.

Habibi, Deputy Secretary for Organization of the DPD I of the Golkar Party in Jambi Province, explained that the selection process at the regional level had been conducted in accordance with formal organizational procedures. According to him, DPD I received nominations from DPD II and carried out administrative verification based on party regulations. However, he emphasized that the final determination of candidates remained under the authority of the Central Executive Board (DPP), which considered survey results and the party's broader national strategy. This indicates that while procedural mechanisms at the regional level functioned as a channel for aspiration and administrative filtering, strategic-electoral considerations at the national level ultimately shaped the final decision.

Further elaboration from Habibi revealed that although the Golkar DPD II of Jambi City had proposed Budi Setiawan as the sole candidate based on plenary decisions from 11 sub-district branches, the DPP ultimately endorsed the Maulana-Diza pair. The decision was primarily grounded in survey data from three institutions showing significantly higher electability for Maulana-Diza, reportedly exceeding 80 percent, while Budi Setiawan's electability did not rank among the top three. This demonstrates that quantitative electability metrics were prioritized over internal consolidation outcomes, reflecting a pragmatic and vote-oriented approach in candidate selection.

From the perspective of the regional structure, Budi Setiawan, as Chair of the Golkar Party's DPD II in Jambi City, maintained that his nomination emerged through a bottom-up deliberative mechanism conducted procedurally at the PL and PK levels and subsequently ratified

in a DPD II plenary meeting. His account underscores that the lower-level structures actively exercised their participatory role within the formal framework of party rules. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the party's statutes clearly stipulate that decisions made by the DPP are final and binding upon all organizational levels. This reflects a strong normative commitment to hierarchical discipline within the party structure, even when local aspirations are not accommodated in the final outcome.

This finding is further corroborated by Mumtaz Mona, Secretary of DPD II Golkar Kota Jambi, who affirmed that the entire selection process had been conducted in stages and in full compliance with administrative requirements. Similarly, Yuliantie Ismail, a Golkar cadre, viewed the process as providing adequate space for lower structures to articulate their aspirations through internal mechanisms. These perspectives suggest that procedural inclusiveness was formally maintained, even though substantive decision-making authority remained centralized.

From an external analytical standpoint, Dr. Pahrudin HM, M.A., assessed that centralized decision-making has historically characterized the Golkar Party. In his view, although regional selection processes may appear open and participatory, the ultimate authority continues to rest with the DPP. This pattern aligns with Golkar's organizational tradition, which emphasizes structural cohesion and strategic central control. However, Citra Darminto, S.IP., M.MP., offered a critical perspective, arguing that decisions that do not prioritize internal cadres reflect limitations in the practice of internal party democracy. According to this view, while formal mechanisms are implemented, substantive democratization within the party remains constrained by centralized authority and electoral pragmatism.

Overall, the results of this study confirm that the nomination mechanism in the Golkar Party in Jambi City is procedural and aspirational at the regional level, but centralized at the final decision stage, with electability surveys as the dominant factor in decision-making. This discussion shows that the decision-making process for the 2024 Jambi mayoral candidacy in the Golkar Party was entirely controlled by the Central Leadership Council (DPP) without involving the DPD II in substantive discussions. The research findings indicate that although internal support at the local level was focused on Budi Setiawan, this preference was not taken into account when determining the candidate. The DPP's decision to nominate the Maulana-Diza pair caused disappointment at the regional level, but it was still carried out by the local structure due to Golkar's centralistic character, which makes central decisions the final directive that must be obeyed.

This decision-making pattern aligns with the findings of Primadi & Purwaningsih (2019), who stated that the mechanism for selecting regional head candidates in the Golkar Party is generally under the control of the central elite. This finding also reinforces Ridha (2017) view that local aspirations often have no significant influence on the party's strategic decision-making process, especially when they conflict with the interests and electoral calculations of the national elite. From a theoretical perspective, Randall & Svasand (2002) emphasize that an ideally institutionalized party should have a stable, inclusive decision-making mechanism that provides space for participation throughout its entire internal structure. However, the DPP's dominance in determining candidates in Jambi City shows that this mechanism is not yet fully participatory. This is in line with Huntington (1968) view that central dominance in political decision-making reflects the immaturity of internal party institutionalization.

This study's analysis reveals that the Golkar Party's strength in Jambi City does not rely on democratic and participatory decision-making mechanisms, but rather on the level of obedience

among cadres to party policies. The local structure's compliance with central decisions does not stem from direct involvement in the decision-making process, but rather from the internalization of the values of loyalty, discipline, and structural obedience that have long been integral to the Golkar Party's political culture.

The study's results show that charismatic figures play a significant role in the internal dynamics of the Golkar Party in Jambi City, particularly in their response to the DPP's decision to nominate Maulana and Diza as candidates for mayor and deputy mayor of Jambi in 2024. Golkar's leadership tradition, which is steeped in political patronage and central figures, makes influential figures informal actors who serve to maintain party stability when there are differences between regional aspirations and central decisions. Although the role of figures is not explicitly regulated in the party constitution and bylaws, the basic values of PD2LT (achievement, dedication, discipline, loyalty, and integrity) become a source of informal legitimacy that allows charismatic figures to play a significant role in directing the political attitudes of cadres, without negating the party's procedural mechanisms.

Habibi, Deputy Secretary for Organization of the Golkar Party DPD I of Jambi Province, explained that senior figures and party elites play a crucial role in maintaining internal cohesion following the issuance of the DPP's final decision. According to him, these senior actors function as mediators who provide clarification to cadres and prevent disappointment from escalating into prolonged internal conflict. Their presence helps ensure that differences arising during the candidacy process do not develop into factional divisions. By continuously emphasizing that the DPP's decision is final and binding under the party's statutes, senior figures reinforce organizational discipline and collective responsibility within the party structure.

Within this dynamic, Budi Setiawan, as Chair of the Golkar Party's DPD II in Jambi City, emerged as a central and charismatic figure in stabilizing internal conditions. Although he had been unanimously proposed by lower-level structures, he chose to accept the DPP's decision and actively consolidate cadres to preserve organizational solidity. His acceptance of the central decision played a strategic role in reducing disappointment among grassroots members, particularly those who perceived that regional aspirations had not been fully accommodated. Through intensive communication, internal consolidation meetings, and explanations regarding survey results that formed the basis of the DPP's decision, he contributed to restoring trust and preventing fragmentation at the local level. This illustrates how leadership attitude and political maturity can function as conflict-management instruments within party organizations.

The significance of Budi Setiawan's role was further emphasized by Mumtaz Mona, Secretary of DPD II Golkar Kota Jambi, who viewed the position of the DPD II chairperson as highly influential in calming internal tensions. From this perspective, the authority and personal approach of the local party leader were decisive in providing cadres with an understanding of the rationale behind the DPP's decision. This suggests that formal hierarchical authority alone is insufficient to maintain cohesion; it must be accompanied by persuasive leadership and effective interpersonal communication.

Similarly, Yuliantie Ismail, a Golkar cadre, assessed that the DPD II chairperson played an effective role in maintaining communication with lower-level structures and preventing divisions at the grassroots level. Continuous engagement with cadres at the sub-district and branch levels was considered essential in ensuring that disappointment did not transform into open resistance or passive disengagement. This finding indicates that organizational stability is sustained not only

through formal compliance with party rules but also through relational networks and ongoing political communication.

External analysis by political observer Dr. Pahrudin HM, M.A., reinforces the interpretation that cadre loyalty within Golkar often revolves around influential figures rather than solely institutional mechanisms. In this context, Budi Setiawan's decision to accept and publicly support the DPP's determination was a key factor in preventing escalation of internal conflict. His stance demonstrated that when a prominent local leader adopts a conciliatory and disciplined approach, cadres are more likely to follow, thereby minimizing the risk of prolonged factionalism.

This assessment aligns with the view of political academic Citra Darminto, S.IP., M.MP., who argued that Budi Setiawan's leadership has contributed to maintaining organizational stability and sustaining political participation among Golkar cadres in Jambi City. Under his leadership, the party has achieved measurable political gains, including securing strategic positions in local legislative institutions. Such achievements strengthen his legitimacy and reinforce his capacity to mobilize cadres in support of party decisions, even when those decisions do not align with initial grassroots preferences.

Overall, these findings demonstrate that internal conflict management within Golkar is strongly influenced by the interplay between centralized authority and figure-based leadership at the local level. While the DPP holds formal decision-making power, the effectiveness of policy implementation and organizational consolidation largely depends on the mediating role of respected local leaders who translate central decisions into accepted collective commitments. The findings of this interview are reinforced by a report by Jambilink.id, (2024) entitled "Budi Setiawan Declares Support and Affirms Golkar's Solidity with Maulana-Diza," which confirms that Budi Setiawan openly declared his loyalty to the party and instructed the entire party machine to support the victory of the Maulana-Diza pair.

Overall, the results of this study indicate that charismatic figures, particularly Budi Setiawan as Chairman of the Golkar Party's Jambi City Chapter, play a crucial role in maintaining party stability. His charisma enables the maintenance of cadre discipline, the mitigation of internal conflicts, and the preservation of party unity despite differences in aspirations between regional structures and central decisions. The role of this charismatic figure is a key factor in maintaining the integrity and solidity of the Golkar Party in Jambi City at a crucial political moment.

This discussion shows that charismatic figures play a strategic role in maintaining internal stability within the Golkar Party in Jambi City following the DPP's decision. Figures such as Budi Setiawan serve as a balancing force when tensions arise, as they have high legitimacy and trust among cadres. Although not supported as a candidate, Budi's attitude of accepting the central decision and encouraging cadres to prioritize party unity proved effective in easing disappointment and preventing internal divisions.

This finding is in line with the research by Anawati & Al-Hamdi (2020), which confirms that local figures with strong reputations and emotional ties are able to maintain internal harmony when organizational policies are not aligned with the aspirations of the grassroots, because they possess moral authority that is recognized by cadres. In addition, Subekti & Al-Hamdi (2024) Show that the acceptance and agreement of local elites are the most effective mechanisms in reducing conflict escalation, because the attitudes of elites tend to be followed by cadres at lower levels.

Theoretically, these findings reinforce Huntington (1968) view that the process of party institutionalization requires certain figures to maintain stability when internal pressures increase. (Randall dan Svasand, 2002)also emphasize that respected leadership is an important element for the party's survival in a dynamic political situation. Thus, Golkar's solidity in Jambi City is not only shaped by formal organizational mechanisms but is also significantly influenced by the role of charismatic figures who can intervene morally and persuasively, preventing internal tensions from developing into open opposition.

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Prevention of Internal Conflicts and Resolution of Internal Conflicts

The results of the study show that, normatively, the Golkar Party has an institutional framework in place for preventing internal conflicts, as stipulated in its Articles of Association. Article 30, paragraph (2) states that the Honorary Council functions to maintain, develop, and actualize the basic values and honor of the Golkar Party. However, empirical findings show that this conflict prevention mechanism has not been optimally implemented, as conflicts still arise openly in the selection process for the 2024 Jambi mayoral candidates. Habibi explained that conflict prevention within the Golkar Party in Jambi Province is carried out through structured and tiered communication mechanisms. According to him, the party routinely conducts deliberative forums at various organizational levels, including daily coordination meetings, periodic plenary sessions, and structured consolidation meetings held monthly and quarterly. These forums function as institutional channels to build consensus and ensure that all structural levels, particularly DPD II, understand and collectively implement decisions made by the DPP. This pattern reflects an effort to institutionalize conflict management through regularized communication and organizational discipline.

At the DPD II level, Budi Setiawan emphasized that preventive measures were initiated early in the selection process through both structural and personal approaches. Structurally, he convened meetings with PK and PL leaders to openly explain the rationale behind the DPP's decision, including the survey data that formed the basis of candidate determination. On a personal level, he directly approached cadres who were most vocal in expressing disappointment, aiming to prevent dissatisfaction from escalating into broader organizational resistance. This dual strategy demonstrates that conflict prevention within the party combines formal institutional mechanisms with personalized leadership engagement.

Mumtaz Mona further noted that internal coordination and consolidation were conducted in stages to minimize misunderstandings at the cadre level. Official information was systematically disseminated to PK and PL structures, while communication flows were carefully managed to maintain unity and prevent fragmentation. By providing gradual updates and clarifications regarding political developments, party leaders sought to reduce speculation and maintain a cohesive organizational narrative. This indicates that communication control and message consistency are viewed as essential instruments for preserving internal stability.

From the cadre perspective, Yuliantie Ismail described conflict prevention efforts as being oriented toward strengthening loyalty and obedience to central decisions. Cadres were continuously reminded that DPP decisions are final and binding under party statutes, and they were encouraged to maintain unity rather than pursue independent or divergent political steps.

This approach reflects a normative emphasis on hierarchical compliance as a primary mechanism for preventing internal division.

However, external analysis by Dr. Pahrudin HM, M.A., suggests that these conflict prevention strategies have not been fully effective due to limitations in transparency and participatory communication. He argued that internal communication should be more open and two-way, allowing regional cadres to feel involved rather than merely instructed. In his assessment, vertical communication patterns remain predominantly top-down, which risks generating perceptions of exclusion among local structures.

This critique is reinforced by the view of political academic Citra Darminto, S.IP., M.MP., who observed that Golkar's internal communication culture often prioritizes informal and personal approaches before activating formal institutional mechanisms. According to this perspective, tensions are first addressed through personal dialogue and deliberation among key figures to reduce emotional intensity, and only subsequently formalized through organizational decisions or, if necessary, the Party Court. Such a pattern suggests that emotional and relational channels are strategically utilized as early-stage conflict mitigation tools before formal adjudication mechanisms are employed. These findings demonstrate that conflict prevention within Golkar in Jambi Province operates through a combination of formal deliberative structures, hierarchical discipline, and informal personalized communication. While institutional forums provide procedural legitimacy, the effectiveness of conflict management largely depends on leadership mediation, message control, and the ability to balance central authority with participatory engagement at the regional level.

Overall, the interview results indicate that although the Golkar Party has implemented various conflict prevention mechanisms, including regular meetings, tiered communication, structural consolidation, and personal approaches, these efforts have not been sufficient to prevent open conflict in the 2024 Jambi mayoral nomination process. The sharp difference between the aspirations of DPD II, which supported Budi Setiawan, and the DPP's decision to nominate the Maulana-Diza pair, coupled with the lack of transparency in survey data and substantive dialogue before the decision was announced, caused internal tensions that were not managed early on. These findings confirm that the mechanisms for preventing internal conflict within the Golkar Party in Jambi City are still procedural in nature and have not addressed the root causes of the differences in interests between the regional and central structures.

This discussion reveals that the prevention of internal conflict within the Golkar Party in Jambi City was achieved through rapid communication between city and subdistrict officials immediately after the announcement of the DPP's decision to endorse the Maulana-Diza pair. The explanation of the political reasons behind the central decision proved to ease the initial tension, even though the local structure's support had previously been focused on Budi Setiawan. However, there was still resistance at the cadre level, indicating that conflict prevention had not been comprehensive and sustainable. These findings are in line with the research of Ghofur & al Arif (2017) and Dewangga & Solihah (2023), which confirm that rapid communication plays an important role in reducing internal party conflicts, but is not sufficient if it is only informal. In the context of Golkar in Jambi City, this communication succeeded in calming the initial turmoil, but has not been able to resolve the structural tensions between regional aspirations and central decisions. Theoretically, Randall & Svasand (2002) place conflict prevention as part of the systemic dimension of party institutionalization, namely the party's ability to have stable and

predictable conflict management mechanisms. The reliance on spontaneous responses and ad hoc communication suggests that the level of institutionalization of conflict prevention in Golkar, Jambi City, is still not optimal.

Based on these findings, it can be concluded that conflict prevention in Golkar Kota Jambi has been implemented; however, it remains procedural and reactive. Party solidity depends more on the quick response of the elite than on a structured and institutionalized conflict prevention system. Therefore, strengthening more systematic internal communication and establishing a mediation space from the early stages of decision-making are important requirements to prevent conflicts from escalating.

The study's results show that the resolution of internal conflicts within the Golkar Party in Jambi City was carried out after differences of opinion arose between DPD II, which supported Budi Setiawan, and DPP, which appointed the Maulana-Diza pair. Unlike conflict prevention, this stage focuses on concrete actions after the conflict has occurred. Normatively, the conflict resolution mechanism is regulated in Article 72 paragraph (2) of the Golkar party constitution and bylaws, which stipulates that the Party Court is the main channel for resolving internal legal disputes. However, in practice in Jambi City, conflicts are often resolved through non-litigation mechanisms, including deliberation, direct clarification, and tiered consolidation, without recourse to the Party Court.

Habibi explained that conflict resolution was undertaken through direct institutional engagement between DPD I and DPD II following the issuance of the DPP's decision. Once differences in aspirations within DPD II became apparent, the leadership of DPD I immediately facilitated a coordination meeting with Budi Setiawan and the DPD II administrators at the provincial party office. In this forum, DPD I provided a comprehensive clarification regarding the rationale behind the selection of the Maulana-Diza pair, including an explanation of the survey methodology and the empirical considerations underlying the DPP's determination. This approach reflects a formal and structured effort to reduce tension by increasing informational transparency and reinforcing the legitimacy of the decision-making process.

At the DPD II level, Budi Setiawan responded by promptly consolidating cadres at lower organizational levels. He acknowledged the disappointment felt by some members but emphasized the obligation of all party structures to comply with the statutes and uphold organizational discipline. Through internal meetings and direct communication with sub-district and branch leaders, he reaffirmed Golkar's commitment to implementing the central decision. This consolidation effort illustrates how local leadership functions as a stabilizing intermediary, translating central directives into locally accepted commitments.

Mumtaz Mona further highlighted that rapid communication and administrative coordination were crucial in mitigating the initial turbulence following the decision. Timely clarification and structured dissemination of information helped prevent rumors and speculation from spreading among cadres. As a result, the internal atmosphere gradually stabilized after the explanatory meetings were conducted. This suggests that speed and coordination in organizational communication are key variables in effective conflict resolution.

From the cadre perspective, Yuliantie Ismail indicated that the conflict was ultimately settled through deliberation and consensus-building mechanisms. After receiving clarification from party leaders, cadres accepted the decision and refrained from escalating dissatisfaction into open resistance. This outcome demonstrates that, within Golkar's organizational culture,

deliberative forums remain an important instrument for restoring cohesion after contentious decisions.

External analysis by Dr. Pahrudin HM, M.A., assessed that the resolution process followed a common pattern found in many political parties, namely consolidation through structural communication and hierarchical coordination. However, he noted that the approach was reactive rather than preventive, as it was initiated only after dissatisfaction had emerged. In his view, more transparent and participatory communication at earlier stages might have minimized the potential for conflict from the outset.

This assessment is consistent with the perspective of Citra Darminto, S.IP., M.MP., who observed that the resolution process can be considered relatively successful because it did not generate prolonged factional divisions. Although initial disagreements occurred, party structures ultimately reunited behind the DPP's decision, and no sustained fragmentation was observed. The absence of ongoing division indicates that the conflict resolution mechanism—combining clarification, consolidation, and hierarchical discipline—was broadly accepted by the actors involved.

Overall, these findings demonstrate that conflict resolution within Golkar in Jambi Province relies on a structured hierarchical approach supported by rapid communication, leadership mediation, and deliberative consolidation. While effective in restoring short-term unity, the process also reveals the need for more anticipatory and participatory communication strategies to reduce the likelihood of similar conflicts in the future.

Overall, the study's results indicate that the resolution of internal conflicts within the Golkar Party in Jambi City occurred relatively quickly and effectively through open communication, immediate consolidation, and the moderate attitude of key actors. DPD I played a role in providing substantive clarification on the DPP's decision, while DPD II calmed cadres through a persuasive approach and information management. Despite differences in aspirations between regional and central structures, structural discipline and adaptive leadership enabled Golkar to maintain organizational solidity without prolonged conflict escalation.

This discussion reveals that the resolution of internal conflicts within the Golkar Party in Jambi City following the DPP's decision was achieved through informal measures that emphasized personal communication and rapid consolidation. The detailed explanation from the DPD I regarding the reasons for Maulana-Diza's candidacy, accompanied by the DPD II's persuasive approach to cadres at the sub-district level, proved capable of reducing initial disappointment and preventing the conflict from developing into open rejection. This resolution occurred without involving the Party Court or other formal procedures, allowing the conflict to be resolved internally and relatively quickly.

These findings are in line with the research by Anawati & Al-Hamdi (2020), which confirms that interpersonal communication based on family values is effective in resolving internal conflicts within parties with a collegial culture. In addition, Subekti & Al-Hamdi (2024) show that agreements among local elites are a key factor in maintaining stability when central decisions conflict with regional aspirations. Both findings are consistent with the dynamics of Golkar in Jambi City, which relies on closeness between actors and elite consensus to restore organizational harmony. From a theoretical perspective, Firman Noor (2015) places conflict resolution as an important indicator of party institutionalization, where an institutionalized party ideally has clear and systematic conflict resolution mechanisms. In the context of Golkar in Jambi

City, conflict resolution has succeeded in maintaining internal stability, but it relies more on interpersonal relationships and the moral authority of local elites than on standard institutional mechanisms. This condition indicates that the stability achieved is adaptive and personal in nature, rather than fully institutionalized.

Systematic Cadre Development: Political Recruitment and Cadre Development System

The results of the study indicate that the recruitment process for Golkar Party regional head candidates in the 2024 Jambi City Regional Head Elections is normatively aligned with Chapter VIII, Article 11, paragraph (4) of the Golkar party constitution and bylaws regarding the Election of Public Officials. This provision stipulates that the selection of public officials must proceed through three main stages: registration, screening, and appointment. This mechanism is designed to be tiered and systematic, based on the principles of democracy and objectivity, with priority given to cadres who meet the PD2LT (Achievement, Dedication, Discipline, Loyalty, and Integrity) standards.

Habibi explained that although internal cadres are formally given opportunities to participate in the recruitment process, the final determination of candidates is strongly influenced by survey results and electability considerations. According to him, Golkar does not close access for local cadres to compete; however, strategic calculations regarding the party's chances of victory remain the primary consideration at the decision-making stage. This indicates that the recruitment model combines procedural openness with pragmatic electoral rationality, where competitiveness in elections becomes the dominant variable in final candidate endorsement.

From the perspective of internal cadres, Budi Setiawan emphasized that his candidacy represented the outcome of a long-term cadre development process within the party. He highlighted that he had participated in various levels of party training, technical guidance programs, and capacity-building initiatives, including activities organized by the Golkar Institute. His political trajectory reflects a bottom-up career path rooted in organizational experience rather than external recruitment. Support from sub-district structures, in his view, was based on recognition of this sustained cadreization process. This narrative underscores the expectation among grassroots members that loyalty and long-term organizational engagement should be rewarded with nomination opportunities.

Mumtaz Mona similarly stressed that the party provides structured avenues for cadre preparation through training programs and training-of-trainers (TOT) initiatives aimed at strengthening the capacity of young and emerging members. These programs are designed to ensure that cadres are institutionally prepared to assume strategic political roles. Such efforts demonstrate that, at the procedural and developmental level, Golkar invests in systematic cadre formation as part of its organizational sustainability strategy. From the perspective of female cadres, Yuliantie Ismail assessed that the party provides sufficient participatory space for members who are formally registered and actively involved in organizational activities. According to this view, cadres have opportunities to convey suggestions and opinions, and younger members are encouraged to engage in various party processes. This suggests that inclusiveness at the participation level is relatively well maintained within the organizational structure.

However, external analysis by Dr. Pahrudin HM, M.A., points to a structural weakness in the synchronization of cadre development between regional, provincial, and central levels. He argued that effective recruitment requires integrated mapping and preparation of potential candidates across all tiers of the party hierarchy. Without strong coordination and harmonization

in training and evaluation processes, tensions may arise when regional aspirations are not aligned with central strategic considerations. The case in Jambi, therefore, reflects a gap between local cadre development efforts and centralized electoral decision-making. A similar assessment was expressed by Citra Darminto, S.IP., M.MP., who viewed Golkar's recruitment process as generally open and institutionally established, particularly at lower organizational levels. As an established political party with extensive experience in nurturing regional figures, Golkar possesses relatively structured recruitment mechanisms that are formally aligned with organizational rules and party values. Nevertheless, she noted that at the final stage of nomination, political decisions do not always prioritize internally developed cadres. This condition raises questions about the consistency between formal cadre training processes and practical political decisions, revealing a potential disconnect between institutional preparation and strategic electoral pragmatism.

Overall, these findings indicate that Golkar's recruitment system operates within a dual logic: procedural inclusiveness and systematic cadre development on the one hand, and centralized, electability-driven decision-making on the other. While opportunities for participation and training are institutionally available, the decisive stage of candidate endorsement remains highly dependent on strategic calculations at the central level, which may limit the substantive realization of internal party democracy.

Overall, the study's results show that the recruitment process for Golkar Party regional head candidates in Jambi City in 2024 was procedurally carried out in accordance with the provisions of the party constitution and bylaws, from registration to determination. Internal cadres, such as Budi Setiawan, had the opportunity to participate in all stages of the selection process, from the PL to the DPD II levels. However, the final decision remained in the hands of the DPP, which prioritized electability and the chances of victory over the continuity of internal cadre development. This situation reveals a tension between the normative mechanism of cadre development and the electoral political orientation that dominates the selection of the final candidates.

This discussion demonstrates that the recruitment process for Golkar Party candidates for the regional head of Jambi City in the 2024 Regional Elections has been procedurally aligned with the provisions of the party constitution and bylaws and Implementation Guidelines Number 3, featuring an open and tiered selection mechanism. Internal cadres such as Budi Setiawan had the opportunity to participate in all stages of the selection process at the local level. However, the study's findings confirm that the final decision rests entirely with the DPP, with the main considerations being the electability and chances of victory of the Maulana-Diza pair, indicating that regional aspirations have no significant influence on the selection of candidates.

These findings are in line with research by Cumaedy & Sarofah (2019), which shows that political party recruitment in Indonesia tends to be elitist and dependent on the decisions of the central elite. Primadi & Purwaningsih (2019) This was also confirmed, finding that the Golkar Party prioritizes the electoral appeal of candidates, even though its internal cadres have undergone a long process of regeneration. In the context of Jambi City, this pattern places regional structures more as administrative implementers than as strategic decision-makers. From a theoretical perspective, Randall dan Svasand (2002) emphasize that recruitment is a key element in party institutionalization, which requires consistency between formal rules and political practices. The dominance of central decisions in candidate recruitment suggests an imbalance in the institutionalization process, as regional autonomy is not functioning optimally. Thus, this study's

analysis shows that Golkar's recruitment in Jambi City does not yet fully reflect substantive internal democracy. Party solidity is better maintained through acceptance of the central elite authority structure than through cadre involvement in political decision-making.

The results of the study show that the Golkar Party's cadre development system has a clear normative basis in the party constitution and bylaws. Chapter IV on Cadres, Article 6 paragraph (2) emphasizes that party cadres are members who have undergone cadre education and training and have been screened based on the criteria of ideological mentality, understanding of the party's vision, mission and platform, achievement, dedication, discipline, loyalty, and integrity (PD2LT), leadership, militancy, and independence. This provision demonstrates that cadre development in the Golkar Party is structured as a tiered process, encompassing ideological education, strengthening organizational values, enhancing leadership capacity, and shaping the political ethics of cadres.

Habibi explained that cadre development within the Golkar Party in Jambi Province is conducted routinely and continuously through structured education and training programs. Each year, DPD I organizes formal cadre training designed to strengthen members' understanding of party ideology, the fundamentals of political organization, political communication skills, and campaign strategies. According to this account, these activities are not merely ceremonial but constitute a concrete commitment to ensuring that cadres possess adequate political and organizational capacity. This reflects an institutionalized approach to cadre formation aimed at maintaining organizational sustainability and ideological cohesion.

From the internal cadre perspective, Budi Setiawan emphasized that the party provides opportunities for advancement to members who meet the PD2LT standards—achievement (*prestasi*), dedication (*dedikasi*), discipline (*disiplin*), loyalty (*loyalitas*), and integrity (*tidak tercela*). These criteria function as normative benchmarks in evaluating cadre eligibility for strategic political roles. In principle, this framework suggests that career progression within Golkar is merit-based and aligned with clearly articulated organizational values. Mumtaz Mona further described cadre development as a systematic and tiered process. Prospective and existing cadres are required to pass through stages such as selection, training-of-trainers (TOT), formal training sessions, and periodic coaching. Through these mechanisms, members are expected to internalize party direction, strengthen their ideological commitment, and enhance their organizational competence. This staged model indicates that Golkar has institutionalized cadreization as a structured process rather than an ad hoc activity.

Similarly, Yuliantie Ismail noted that participation in cadre education is considered an obligation for party members. After formal recruitment, cadres undergo training programs intended to deepen their knowledge of Golkar's organizational principles and political orientation. This requirement reinforces the idea that ideological consolidation and organizational alignment are central components of party membership. From an external analytical standpoint, Dr. Pahrudin HM, M.A., argued that cadre development should be synergized with systematic electability mapping. In his view, sustainable internal consolidation requires a balance between long-term cadre preparation and empirical measurement through periodic surveys. By integrating development programs with electability assessments, the party can ensure that well-trained cadres also possess measurable competitiveness in elections. Such synchronization would reduce tensions between institutional preparation and strategic political decision-making.

Citra Darminto, S.IP., M.MP., offered a complementary yet critical perspective. She assessed that Golkar's cadre development system is relatively strong, tiered, and routine, reflecting the characteristics of an established political party. However, she observed that this systematic development does not always serve as the primary reference in determining candidates for regional head elections. In practice, cadres who have undergone extensive preparation are not consistently nominated, particularly in gubernatorial and mayoral contests. This recurring pattern suggests a gap between institutionalized cadre formation and the political pragmatism that characterizes final candidate selection.

Overall, these findings indicate that Golkar's cadre development model is structurally robust and normatively grounded in meritocratic principles. Nevertheless, its effectiveness in shaping actual nomination outcomes remains contingent upon the alignment between internal training mechanisms and centralized electoral strategies. The tension between institutional cadreization and electability-driven decision-making continues to be a central challenge in realizing substantive internal party democracy.

Overall, the study's results indicate that cadre development within the Golkar Party in Jambi City is conducted in an orderly and tiered manner through training, Training of Trainer (TOT), technical guidance, and Golkar Institute training, which enhances the ideological, organizational, and leadership capacities of cadres. However, despite the strength of cadre development, its results have not yet become the primary basis for determining regional head candidates. In practice, the final decision is largely determined by the DPP based on electability, so the quality of cadres produced through training does not always receive proportional consideration in the nomination process.

This discussion shows that the Golkar Party's cadre development system in Jambi City has been running regularly through education and training, training of trainers (TOT), technical guidance, and the Golkar Institute program. This process has produced cadres who are considered competent, such as Budi Setiawan, who represents the success of local cadre development. However, the study's findings show that the results of cadre development have not been a major factor in determining regional head candidates, as the DPP's decisions still prioritize electability considerations over the continuity of internal cadre development. These findings are in line with the research by Cumaedy & Sarofah (2019), which noted that Golkar Party cadre development is often administrative in nature and has had little to no significant impact on the nomination process. A similar finding was also shown by Dewangga & Ratnia Solihah (2023), who found that even though the party has a solid cadre development structure, strategic decisions are still more determined by electoral calculations than by the results of cadre development.

From a theoretical perspective, Basedau & Stroh (2008) emphasize that party institutionalization requires continuity between cadre development and its utilization in the political process. When developed cadres are not the main reference in nominations, the function of cadre development has not been fully integrated into strategic decision-making. Thus, this study concludes that Golkar's cadre development in Jambi City is effective in building internal capacity, but it does not yet have a decisive strategic influence, as the electoral logic applied by the central elite remains more dominant.

Commitment to Shared Values: Commitment to the Party's Vision and Mission and Loyalty to Party Decisions

The results of the study show that the commitment of Golkar Party cadres in Jambi City to the party's vision and mission has a strong normative basis in the party constitution and bylaws. Chapter V, Article 8, Paragraph (2), letter a, emphasizes the obligation of every cadre to internalize and practice the Doctrine, Pledge, and New Paradigm of the Golkar Party. In the context of the 2024 regional elections, this vision and mission are understood as the party's strategic orientation, which prioritizes electoral victory and organizational solidity as its primary objectives, thereby forming the basis for cadres' acceptance of the DPP's decisions.

Habibi emphasized that compliance with DPP decisions within the Golkar Party is grounded in the internalization of the party's vision and mission as the primary ideological compass. According to him, cadres are consistently reminded that organizational interests must take precedence over personal or factional considerations. Through consolidation forums and internal communication, party leaders frame central decisions as political mandates that must be collectively implemented. This approach reflects an effort to embed hierarchical obedience within an ideological narrative, thereby strengthening normative legitimacy rather than relying solely on structural authority. A similar perspective was articulated by Budi Setiawan, who underscored the importance of positioning the party's vision and mission above individual political ambitions. In his view, cadre compliance is not merely the result of coercive discipline but stems from an understanding of party rules as stipulated in the party constitution and bylaws, as well as technical and operational guidelines (Juklak and Juknis). This suggests that institutionalized regulations function as instruments of value internalization, reinforcing a culture of procedural adherence within the organization.

Mumtaz Mona further framed organizational discipline as a logical consequence of ideological commitment. Acceptance of DPP decisions, even when they diverge from local preferences, is interpreted as a manifestation of loyalty and neutrality toward the party's collective goals. From this standpoint, resistance to central authority is seen as potentially destabilizing and contrary to the organizational ethos. Such reasoning highlights how discipline is constructed not only as a formal obligation but also as a moral duty tied to the preservation of party unity.

From the cadre perspective, Yuliantie Ismail noted that the party's vision and mission serve as the primary reference point in maintaining internal solidity. Even when central decisions do not align with initial regional aspirations, cadres are encouraged to reorient themselves toward broader organizational objectives. This indicates that ideological cohesion operates as a unifying framework capable of mitigating dissatisfaction arising from political competition. External analysis by Dr. Pahrudin HM, M.A., supports the interpretation that the tensions observed were more reflective of differences in political preferences than of ideological erosion. In his assessment, the party's core values remained intact, as evidenced by the eventual acceptance of the DPP's decision and the restoration of internal unity following consolidation efforts. This suggests that ideological foundations continue to function as stabilizing elements within the party's organizational culture.

However, Citra Darminto, S.IP., M.MP., offered a critical perspective regarding the consistency of party elites in upholding these values. She observed that while loyalty to the party's vision and mission is often emphasized rhetorically, inconsistencies may emerge in practice, particularly among elite actors whose decisions are influenced by competing political interests. In

contrast, lower-level cadres tend to display greater consistency in adhering to organizational norms. This critique points to a potential gap between normative commitments and political behavior at the elite level, raising questions about the depth of value internalization across different strata of the party hierarchy. Overall, these findings indicate that compliance within Golkar is framed as an ideological and moral commitment to the party's vision and mission, reinforced by formal regulations and consolidation mechanisms. Nevertheless, the consistency of this commitment may vary across organizational levels, revealing an ongoing tension between ideological discipline and political pragmatism

Overall, the study's results indicate that commitment to the Golkar Party's vision and mission is a crucial factor in maintaining the uniformity of attitude and discipline among cadres in the city of Jambi. Although there were differences in aspirations at the initial stage of candidacy, the DPP's decision was ultimately accepted as part of the party's ideological line, which must be adhered to in order to maintain organizational solidity and enhance electoral victory opportunities. This discussion reveals that a commitment to the vision and mission of the Golkar Party is a significant factor in maintaining unity among cadres in Jambi City following the DPP's decision to endorse the Maulana-Diza ticket. Although there were differences in political preferences during the selection stage, and the majority of the local structure hoped that Budi Setiawan would be nominated, all sources emphasized that the central decision was ultimately accepted because it was seen as part of the party's ideological line that had to be followed. Loyalty to the decision-making hierarchy, the party's reputation, and the orientation toward electoral victory are clear manifestations of commitment to Golkar's political mission, preventing personal disappointment from developing into open opposition.

These findings align with research by Primadi & Purwaningsih (2019), which confirms that the Golkar Party has a strong tradition of structural obedience, rooted in the party's vision of winning elections. This ideological commitment is not merely formal, but serves as a guideline for cadres' political behavior when facing internal crises. From a theoretical perspective, Randall & Svasand (2002) explain that the internalization of party values and vision is an important characteristic of a party that is beginning to become institutionalized. When basic values are believed by cadres, the organization has greater resilience to tensions between regional aspirations and central decisions. In the context of Golkar in Jambi City, the vision of maintaining political stability and electoral victory serves as a unifying mechanism as well as a psychological calming agent for cadres. Thus, Golkar's internal stability is not only supported by its organizational structure, but also by a strong ideological awareness among its cadres.

The study's results show that the loyalty of Golkar Party cadres in Jambi City to party decisions has a strong normative basis in the party constitution and bylaws. Chapter VII Article 16 paragraph (1) letter (b) requires members to uphold the party constitution and bylaws and all organizational regulations, while Chapter VIII Article 18 paragraph (1) letter (c) emphasizes the obligation of cadres to actively implement Golkar Party policies and programs. This provision establishes compliance with DPP decisions as a formal obligation and integral part of organizational discipline, particularly in the context of strategic policies, such as determining regional head candidates.

Habibi emphasized that decisions issued by the DPP are final and that their acceptance among cadres is achieved through consolidation and rational explanation. According to his account, party leaders provide comprehensive clarification regarding the empirical and strategic

basis of the decision, particularly by explaining survey results that underpin candidate selection. This rationalization process is followed by structured consolidation meetings aimed at reinforcing collective understanding and organizational discipline. Through this combination of informational transparency and hierarchical coordination, cadres are encouraged to perceive central decisions not as arbitrary impositions but as scientifically grounded political strategies intended to secure electoral victory.

Budi Setiawan highlighted the importance of leadership attitude in shaping cadre loyalty. In his view, when local leaders demonstrate openness and publicly accept central decisions, cadres are more likely to follow suit. Repeated communication, clarification of the rationale behind centralistic decisions, and consistent messaging regarding organizational obligations serve to strengthen compliance. This finding suggests that loyalty within the party is mediated not only by formal rules but also by exemplary leadership behavior that models adherence to institutional authority. Mumtaz Mona further underscored that structural compliance is fundamental to maintaining party solidity. Acceptance of central decisions is framed as part of a broader commitment to prioritizing organizational interests, which are equated with the interests of constituents. When the chairperson and party administrators demonstrate discipline in implementing DPP directives, lower-level cadres are expected to mirror this stance. This reflects a cascading model of obedience, in which loyalty flows downward from elite conformity to grassroots compliance.

From the cadre perspective, Yuliantie Ismail described loyalty as being manifested through concrete political actions, including educating lower-level members, maintaining communication networks, accepting central decisions, and continuing mobilization efforts to strengthen public support for Golkar. Thus, loyalty is not confined to passive acceptance but is translated into active political engagement aimed at advancing party objectives. External analysis by Dr. Pahrudin HM, M.A., reinforces the view that cadre loyalty is cultivated through systematic cadre development and political education that emphasize organizational discipline. He argued that internal training processes must instill the principle that institutional loyalty takes precedence over personal preferences. In this framework, acceptance of central decisions is not merely procedural compliance but a reflection of internalized organizational values shaped through tiered education and continuous political socialization.

Meanwhile, Citra Darminto, emphasized the centralistic character of Golkar as a structural factor underpinning cadre compliance. In her assessment, ultimate authority consistently resides with the DPP, creating a clear hierarchical boundary within which cadres operate. Loyalty to central decisions therefore becomes an indicator of alignment with the organization's structural line. This perspective highlights that cadre obedience is reinforced not only by ideological commitment and leadership mediation but also by the institutional design of centralized authority. Overall, these findings demonstrate that acceptance of DPP decisions within Golkar is constructed through a combination of rational justification, leadership example, organizational discipline, political education, and centralized institutional structure. Loyalty emerges as both a normative value cultivated through cadreization and a structural expectation embedded within the party's hierarchical framework.

Overall, the study's results show that the loyalty of Golkar Party cadres in Jambi City remains intact, despite differences in aspirations between regional and central structures. All informants emphasized that the DPP's decision was considered final and binding. Budi Setiawan's

attitude of continuing to work to secure the party's official candidate position is a concrete example of cadre loyalty, which is supported by structural acceptance from the DPD II to cadres at lower levels. These findings show that the centralistic character and internal political maturity allow the solidity of the Golkar Party in Jambi City to be maintained through compliance with central decisions.

This discussion shows that cadre loyalty to the decisions of the Central Leadership Council (DPP) was the most decisive factor in maintaining the stability of the Golkar Party in Jambi City during the 2024 Simultaneous Regional Elections. Although most of the local structures previously wanted Budi Setiawan to be nominated, all sources emphasized that the central decision was considered final and mandatory. This compliance is reflected in the acceptance at all levels, from the DPD II to the sub-district level, so that differences in preference did not develop into open resistance. Budi Setiawan's active support for the Maulana-Diza pair is perceived as a concrete example of political loyalty, which confirms that cadre loyalty extends beyond the normative level and is manifested in everyday political actions.

This finding is in line with Ridha (2017) Research confirms that structural loyalty is a historical characteristic of the Golkar Party, enabling it to survive various internal dynamics and conflicts. Primadi & Purwaningsih (2019) also found that Golkar's hierarchical culture encourages cadres to accept central decisions without significant resistance, especially when these decisions are linked to the party's overall strategic interests. Thus, the findings of this study reinforce the view that the loyalty of Golkar cadres has strong cultural and historical roots within the organization. From a theoretical perspective, Huntington (1968) explains that loyalty and obedience to central authority are characteristics of parties with strong organizational structures, although they do not always reflect inclusive democratic processes. This concept is relevant to the dynamics of Golkar in Jambi City, where obedience to the center functions as an integration mechanism that maintains party stability amid political pressure. This study's analysis reveals that Golkar solidity in Jambi City is primarily driven by strong structural loyalty rather than participatory institutional mechanisms, and it is this pattern that prevents internal conflicts from escalating into open disputes.

Conclusion

Based on the results of research on four indicators of political party solidity according to Firman Noor (2015) It can be concluded that the Golkar Party in Jambi City, in the 2024 simultaneous regional elections, is in a solid condition but is not yet fully institutionally strong. This solidity is not the result of participatory and institutionalized organizational mechanisms, but rather relies on the role of local actors in maintaining internal stability, the discipline of the structure in implementing the decisions of the Central Leadership Council, and the strong loyalty and commitment of cadres to the interests and victory of the party. The effectiveness of charismatic figures, conflict resolution mechanisms, commitment to the party's vision and mission, and loyalty to party decisions have proven capable of preventing open conflict despite differences in aspirations in determining regional head candidates. However, this study also reveals striking structural weaknesses, particularly in the decision-making process, which remains centralized, conflict prevention mechanisms that are not yet systematically institutionalized, and recruitment and regeneration patterns that tend to be pragmatic and oriented towards electability rather than leadership regeneration.

This condition confirms that the solidity of the Golkar Party in Jambi City is adaptive and corrective, capable of maintaining short-term stability, but potentially fragile if it continues to depend on figures and personal loyalty without strengthening a sustainable organizational system. Therefore, the Golkar Party in Jambi City is advised to strengthen the institutionalization of the party through the development of a more tiered and participatory decision-making mechanism, building an open and institutionalized conflict prevention system, and placing regeneration as the main instrument of leadership based on the basic values of Golkar. In addition, strengthening a culture of constructive internal criticism and loyalty to the institution, rather than to individuals, is an important prerequisite for creating a solid and sustainable party. Further research is recommended to expand the scope of the region and methodological approach in order to examine in greater depth the patterns of political party institutionalization, elite relations, and informal factors that influence the resilience of party organizations at the local level.

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