Reinterpreting Domestic Sources of Zambia’s Foreign Policy: The Party and the President

Biggie Joe Ndambwa¹*, Aaron Wiza Siwale²

¹Department of Government and Management Studies, University of Zambia, Zambia
²Department of Government and Management Studies, University of Zambia, Zambia
*Corresponding Author Email: joe.ndambwa@unza.zm

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Abstract

This article examines the domestic factors that have determined and influenced Zambia’s foreign policy. While this attempt has not been as successful as one would wish, some useful insights are obtainable through analysis of the role of the governing parties from the liberation hero and founding President Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and subsequent heads of state and their respective parties, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for National Development (UPND), that have led the country throughout this period. The article contributes to both the rational-actor model and spatial leadership model which measures differential changes in foreign policy decision-making across regimes. The model is a major contribution to the development of viable analysis in changing foreign policy in emerging nations and is an enduring contribution to the modern foreign analysis. This article is an interesting and exciting addition to this model. It also contributes to the discourse on domestic issues that determine political behavior in international affairs. In particular, it discusses the subtleties of presidential power and demonstrates that in the case of Zambia, changes in foreign policy decisions across regimes are mediated by the intervention and personal interests of the president and the influence of the governing parties.

Keywords: Domestic Sources; Foreign Policy; Political Party; President

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Introduction

Regional and international matters have always been of great concern to Zambian Presidents and governing parties since gaining independence from Britain in 1964. The international heritage left by founding President Kenneth Kaunda has been celebrated by many political scientists for the role the country played in the struggle for political independence in the region. Previous works in this genre have argued about some of the explanatory aspects of change and continuity in Zambia’s foreign policy in southern Africa (Momba 2001; Shaw 1979). However, while a lot has been said about foreign policy in the First Republic from 1964 to 1973 and Second Republic from 1974 to 1991, a lot remains to be known regarding the impact of change in domestic politics on Zambia’s foreign policy in the Third Republic (1991-to date).

Examining the positions of politicians on critical issues in international politics can help us understand how a change in leadership can impact foreign policy (Anglin & Shaw, 2021). Every policy statement on regional and global issues can be identified to mean policy alterations or permanence. Undeniably Zambia’s international positions have been driven in part by the demands and opportunities as a function of its geographical location, the structure of regional politics as well as the ideological orientation of the governing parties. In addition economic opportunities and constraints are not always fully critical and thus Zambia’s foreign policy is also influenced by Presidents’ preferences, which in turn are determined through domestic political processes (Edwards, 2022; Songiso, 1984). Therefore, change in Zambia’s foreign policy can result from changes in regional politics or a state’s position on various regional and global political issues. Thus, changes domestically should not politics affect foreign policy, but changes in which social groups that hold political power. This may include the nature of the governing political party and its ideology and social orientation.

The main purpose of this article is to examine the effect of changes in a domestic political structure that come as a result of a change of party or leadership on Zambia’s foreign policy. Because politicians usually have a certain belief system on regional and global problems, they are often inclined to follow policies that are somewhat different from each other. While global issues may not be the most significant reason dividing people and political parties within the Zambian society, in this article, we argue that often the attitude and beliefs of elites in the governing party often corresponds to changes in foreign policy preferences pursued by the state and their political parties (Edwards, 2022). Therefore, when a particular politician and a particular political party that has a different perception and attitude than the previous administration, seizes political power, change in international relations become more expected.

Two factors, in particular, should affect the extent to which changes in domestic support result in significant changes in Zambia’s foreign policy. Foremost in this is the size and extensiveness of the political support essential to keep a particular politician in power affect the likelihood of policy shifts even in international relations (Ndambwa, 2015). Once a politician needs a lot of support from large chunk of society to stay in
power, the policy is inclined to focus on matters of general interest rather than particularistic policies and thus exhibiting more permanency (Scott, 2019).

Subsequently, the extent to which politicians regulate their behavior in international politics often affects the extent of possible change in a country’s foreign policy (Momba, 2001). Meanwhile, politicians in the immediate post-independence era did not so much rely on the support of larger proportions of the population to stay in power than on the support base of governing party, we expect a one-party system to display more permanency in foreign affairs than multiparty democracy due to changes necessitated by regular and electoral competition (Ndambwa, 2020; Momba & Siwale, 2020).

Crafting a country’s foreign policy requires a consideration of the major theories of understanding international politics, primarily from the point of view of the idealist and the realist school of thought (Larmer, 2013). While these schools of thought have labored to explain why states which are conceived as special units in the global system behave the way they do in global politics. Each of the these schools of thought offers a more frugal description of international events and essentially sets foreign policy as more determined by events taking place globally than it determining international activities (Smith, 1986).

For example, in all the the schools of thought, a significant determinant of foreign policy crafting lie in the nature and structure of the international system. The anarchistic order of the international political system, however mediated by conventions, rules and morality has been explained in different viewpoints advanced by the schools of thoughts as perspectives to major determinants of the direction foreign policy decisions will take.

In both idealism and realism, a notion of human nature dominates intellectual discourse (Steve, 1986). Idealist who are mostly influenced by a liberal conception of human nature and conflict, explore ways to build an international system that would help in avoiding any more wars and for ways of building and strengthening democracy as this is believed to enhance peace. Without this being explored, international relations would be characterised by the recurrence of conflict, due either to misunderstanding or the existence of conflicting national interests (Anglin & Shaw, 2021). In this case, idealists endeavour to explain foreign policy through an understanding what human beings could turn out to be and why existing international political institutions are essential (Steve, 1986).

In this article, we wish to acknowledge the value and importance of the these general perspectives of understanding why Zambian presidents behave the way they do and what ought to be done to arrest some of the undesired traits of their behavior and attitudes. Our emphasis is to reinterpret domestic foundations of Zambia’s foreign policy. This has been necessitated by changes in the domestic political system from the time of liberation struggles to today’s postcolonial situation. Our focus is on analyzing the attitudes of president on on several regional and global problems and the impact of the governing party in reinforcing a president’s foreign policy pronouncements. We believe that analyzing foreign policy actions is very critical in that it allows us to better understand how political actors make policy decisions and how they relate to other foreign government and non-government entities.
Foreign policymaking is indeed a complex undertaking as it involves multiple actors working together within structures existing both inside and outside the state to a meaningful decision-making process on international matters. To achieve this, we employ the rational actors' model as proposed by other scholars (Hanania 2021; Lueng 2017). This model is preferable such analysis because of its interpretive power in relation to Zambia. The rational actor model also depends on individual and state-level relations between states and government actions and attitudes as units of analysis. The model uses the accessibility of all-inclusive evidence to policymakers for greater decision-making, and that actions taken throughout are both consistent and comprehensible.

According to Hanania (2021), four main steps must be taken in the rational actor’s decision-making process, (a) identifying the main problem that affects the country’s interests, (b) defining desired outcomes (c) evaluating the expected outcomes of potential policy choices and (d) settling for the most rational decision that maximizes beneficial outcomes are crucial steps that must be well thought-out. While critics of this model argue that it does not consider instances when complete rationality may not be attainable due to limited information to decision-makers, the model is indeed a useful to understanding the intended goals behind a foreign policy actions (Lueng 2017). For instance, Zambia’s government structure is executive-dominated in which the governing party wields enormous influence on major choices (Edwards, 2022). In most cases, the president and the governing party’s “politburo” are at the center of deciding the scope and direction of foreign policy action to take about regional interactions.

Research Methods

The study employed an exploratory research technique relying on qualitative information. According to Cresswell and Cresswell (2012), this technique is used to investigate a problem that is not clearly established in academic inquiry. This is critical because it helps scholars to undertake studies that permit a better understanding of an academic question (Creswell & Creswell, 2012). In such a techniques, scholars usually start with a general idea and uses this research as a method of identifying issues for academic investigation (Bultoph and Johnson, 2019). Thus, this technique is often referred to as interpretive research. As such, the study considered the patterns of foreign policymaking in Zambia under the first government of UNIP under Kenneth Kaunda after colonial rule to the current administration led by the United Party for National Development (UPND) led by Hakainde Hichilema.

To analyze this phenomenon of broad changes in Zambia’s foreign policy, we employ a spatial leadership model as a method of analysis (Cresswell & Cresswell, 2012). The spatial leadership model uses “bridge policy changes” to induce comparability across presidents is used to measure changes in foreign policy preferences across regimes. The descriptive measure for change in Zambia’s foreign policy is captured in over-time changes in cumulative behavior and positions of the Zambian government in international politics on a qualitative measure. Using this information, we are able to compare the positions and attitudes of Zambian presidents over time. In line with this
analytical framework, more turnovers in the office of president are associated with frequent changes in Zambia's foreign policy, and this effect displays itself mainly as intentions reflecting the personal aspirations of the President and the governing party.

The sources of data specifically involved the use of published literature and interviews with former diplomats and politicians. The significance of the method used is that it is a rich source of information as it allows for a combination of information collected through written documents and primary data from selected key informants. The method is ideal for analyzing foreign policy shifts from one political party to another and from one political leader to another in that it is suitable to control for some challenges that would occur within the same administration. For example, from Chiluba to Mwanawasa, there was a challenge when Mwanawasa could not finish his term and his successor had to come up with different foreign policy preferences mainly tilting towards the 'Look East' policy which was different from his predecessor. The same was the case with Micheal Sata and the Patriotic Front on foreign policy which was reshaped when Edgar Lungu became Zambia President in 2015. In August, 2021 the new governing party, the UPND took over power and the outlook of the foreign policy completely changed owing to multiple factors that this paper has addressed. This, then, depended on ensuring that we interviewed respondents that were representative of all the administration under consideration.

**Result and Discussion**

This section discusses the various aspects of Zambia’s foreign policy from Kaunda to Hichilema as influenced by the governing parties. It has been divided into four sub-sections; the first part compares how presidents Kaunda and Chiluba dealt with international problems such as the Arab question, the question of Namibia, and the role of Chinese investment. The second part looks at Mwanawasa’s foreign policy orientation and that of his successor Rupiah Banda. The third party compares Michael Sata’s foreign policy to that of his successor Edgar Lungu. Finally, the last party considers the foreign policy orientation of the new administration under Hakainde Hichilema.

**Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP**

From 1964 to 1991, Zambia’s foreign policy was, by and large, influenced by domestic interests, in particular, the ideological orientation of the governing party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) (Anglin & Shaw, 2021). For Kenneth Kaunda, foreign policy was often assumed to be driven by regional and international imperatives or a commonly accepted view of “the national interest” (Edwards, 2022; Momba, 2001; Brett et al, 2009).

It appears that the discourse on Zambia’s foreign policy under president Kaunda often turned to domestic politics only as an ad hoc explanation for behavior that appeared unusual from the standpoint of regional dynamics (Anglin & Shaw, 2021). Domestic politics was a constraint on the pursuit of the national interest and not as the fundamental determinant of Zambia's foreign policy under Kaunda’s leadership. Although domestic
competition may have influenced “low politics” areas such as trade policy, typically Kaunda considered other areas of foreign policy to be outside the realm of political competition and not subject to partisan interests (Shaw, 1979).

However, other domestic interests influenced Kaunda’s foreign policy (Anglin & Shaw, 2021). For instance, when Kaunda embarked on a nationalization program, owners of capital and labor experienced different costs and benefits. This led owners of capital to prefer a multilateral internationalist strategy based on alliances and owners of labor to prefer a more isolationist strategy based on self-help (Songiso, 1984; Edwards, 2022; Chitonge, 2021). Thus, the domestic economy within the Zambian society that depended on international trade made Kaunda reshape the country’s foreign policy after independence. Among the economic sectors were those actors who preferred economic-based foreign policy with neighboring countries (Anglin & Shaw, 2021, Scott, 2019). These different economic interests may have existed simultaneously and were in competition with one another for control of policy within Zambia under the leadership of Kaunda (Barton, 2016).

Further, it appears that economic interests were not the only source of foreign policy, as race and ideology became the cornerstone of Kaunda’s foreign policy (Anglin & Shaw, 2021, Burdette, 2021). For example, when the white minority had political influence in South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Kaunda did not hesitate to host liberation movements in Zambia, such as the Africa National Congress (ANC) given repressing members of what seemed to have been the same racial group (Burton, 2016; Edwards, 2022). The ideological orientation of UNIP may also have affected Zambia’s general foreign policy orientation during Kaunda’s presidency (Shaw, 1979, Barton, 2016). Consider the case of the ideology of humanism, which becomes part and parcel of Kaunda’s foreign policy. UNIP supported Kaunda actively in pursuing an ideological foreign policy, concerning his support for RENAMO in Mozambique and Jonas Savimbi’s UMLPA in Angola (Anglin & Shaw, 2021; Momba, 2001).

Another domestic source of Kaunda’s foreign policy was the influence of domestic political institutions, such as governing party, UNIP which provided a political base for policy discourse (Songiso, 1984). UNIP as a governing party defined the decision-making process and accountability structure for a regime. However, there was little change across time in Kaunda’s “outward-looking” foreign policy that best provides cross-sectional explanations for variation in Zambia’s foreign policy with Southern African neighbors. By contrast, the policies pursued by President Kaunda through UNIP reflected a shorter-term change in the governing class to whom the regime was accountable (Anglin & Shaw, 2021; Viera, 2016).

The personal philosophy of Humanism at the local and international fronts established Kaunda as a leader that was deep-rooted in Christianity and morality as the core values of Zambian society, made President Kaunda make personal decisions in foreign affairs (Anglin & Shaw, 2021; Shler, 2018). This accounted for foreign policy inconsistencies as he made unusual policy shifts. For instance, the Middle East crisis presented a case in which he suddenly cut ties with Israel and expelled the Israeli Moshav
advisors from the country in solidarity with Palestine in 1973 on the pretext that Israel was committing crimes against humanity in Palestine (Schler, 2018; Evans, 2018).

Despite the prevalence of subjective and post hoc assessments that such factors could have had on Kaunda’s foreign policy, the extent to which the party influenced foreign policy restructuring was not well established outside the economic policy arena (Edwards, 2022; Larmer 2013). However, despite the constraints and imperatives of party politics, President Kaunda retained meaningful choices in foreign policies. These choices were influenced by the interests and preferences of societal groups that President Kaunda represented and the domestic institutional context in Zambia at that time. Kaunda’s source of support for the foreign policy agenda was associated with UNIP (Shaw, 1979). At independence in 1964, UNIP and ANC became the most powerful political parties and sources of Kaunda’s support for a foreign policy in support of the liberation struggle in the region. Stability in foreign affairs was possible the UNIP support emphasized control over access to power and influence rather than formal institutional characteristics (Geddes 1999).

The UNIP support base held sway over foreign policymaking and any possible change in foreign policy could not have been affected (Anglin & Shaw, 2021). Because in single-party systems President Kaunda was more accountable to the party cadre, and because party elites were likely to share basic policy preferences over time, no changes in Zambia's southern Africa policy for the duration of a single-party regime.

It must be mentioned here that Kaunda’s foreign policy took a neutral face (DeRoche, 2016). This means that it did not stand on any competing ideological standpoints of the time throughout the Cold War. This made Zambia take an active role in the nonaligned movement and interacted with both the Western and Eastern blocks. The ultimate aim of this position was basically to partly fulfill the aspirations of Kaunda to have a peaceful country that related with everyone through his philosophy of Humanism (Fujii, 2017).

Chiluba, Mwanawasa, Banda and the MMD

It cannot be denied that the output of Zambia’s foreign policy under Frederick Chiluba and Levy Mwanawasa differs markedly from that of Kaunda (Prokopenko, 2021). However, changes in Zambia’s regional policy in the post-Kaunda era go way beyond these empirical observations. It seems reasonable to argue that change in foreign policy had taken place, characterized not only by different results but also and primarily by a betrayal of the former standards and principles of Zambia’s foreign policy, namely humanism and commitment to the liberation of southern Africa (Taylor, 1997). These factors, however, held sway in Chiluba’s foreign policy in the African region, and indeed with the greater international community. These included the influence from domestic economic interests, political institutions, and of course regional security.

Chiluba’s foreign policy advocated the importance of domestic issues as determinants of Zambia’s economic diplomacy (Edwards, 2022; the Republic of Zambia, 1996). Upon reverting to multiparty democracy in 1991, Chiluba moved towards recognizing and renewing diplomatic relations with the State of Israel and the Apartheid
regime of South Africa signifying a major shift from Kaunda’s foreign policy (Prokopenko, 2021). Using his Christianity stunts with support from many Pentecostal churches in Zambia, Chiluba made a trip to Israel to renew diplomatic relations that were shattered by Kaunda in 1973, much to the exhilaration of the Christian community in the country (Edwards, 2022; Chan, 1994). What ought to be noted in all this is that like in a one-party system, Chiluba was the main actor in international relations with almost monopolistic influence on the course of foreign policy direction. To further consolidate his influence on Zambia’s international relations, Chiluba orchestrated the establishment of a training program of young diplomats and recalled all the experienced diplomats, who, ideally, must have been maintained to help a new government with stability and continuity of foreign relations (Chitonge, 2021).

Unlike his predecessor, Chiluba was of the view that economic interests were a source of the pursuit of the ‘national interest’, as the fundamental determinant of state behavior in international relations (Scott, 2019). To emphasize the importance of domestic economic interests, Chiluba embarked on an audacious privatization program. It appears that the new owners of capital in Zambia preferred a foreign policy with an economic sense (Taylor, 1997). Therefore, domestic economic sectors within the Zambian society that depended on international trade and investment preferred a more internationalist foreign policy. These different economic interests may have existed simultaneously and competed with one another for control of policy within Zambia under Chiluba. The result was that changes in economic policy when Chiluba embarked on privatization of capital resulted in changes in foreign policy, mainly in the area of foreign direct investments and other soft power politics (Pundy, 2004). It was these emerging economic interests after privatization that determined the change in Zambia’s foreign policy.

Unlike Kaunda, Chiluba proposed economic diplomacy due to the desire to restore Zambia’s economy following the economic crisis during the previous Kaunda government (Chitonge, 2021; the Republic of Zambia, 1996). Chiluba’s foreign policy action focused on improving the domestic situation through foreign economic policy initiatives. Chiluba and his team developed extensive economic ties with foreign countries in the form of free trade agreements (FTAs), aligning with the concept of neo-liberalization. Chiluba embarked on free trade projects by dealing with influential trade partners. In the closing phase of his term in April 1996, Zambia conducted FTAs with COMESA member states.

Therefore, Chiluba and his team kept pursuing their strong attitudes towards foreign policy adaptation (Taylor 1997). Chiluba’s economic diplomacy became a mindset to generate the idea of regional economic integration throughout the region, as well as portraying the policy as economic-led regional strengths. This initiative aimed to link the levels of regional groupings, especially in Eastern and Southern Africa. It can also be evidenced by various regional cooperation initiatives such as the COMESA FTA and the SADC FTA concluded in 1999 (Kanenga, 2017).

In pursuit of this foreign policy, Chiluba was of the view that there were many layers of regional cooperation and that international relations are not one standard fits all (Chitonge, 2021). However, the connection between the layers of international
cooperation was fragile, and Zambia could bridge that gap by first dealing with the question of foreign investment to stabilize the domestic economy. This culminated in the COMESA FTA which was established in 2002 under the belief in multi-cooperation economic diplomacy. As Chiluba suggested in 1998 that “the realization of the free market and promote the economic integration would enhance confidences and relations among the countries of Southern Africa, as well as being an important foundation towards the establishment of an FTA” (Tembo, 1996:14). Moreover, strengthening foreign relations in various dimensions was strategized in the form of the FTAs, which Chiluba promoted as an important goal of regional cooperation, in terms of economic cooperation with neighboring countries. The Zambian government encouraged many countries to have a strong integration to follow an action plan of the COMESA member states, so that growth, including collective interests (Chitonge, 2021).

Despite the change of political system from a single-party to a multi-party system in 1991, the influence of political parties on foreign policy almost remained the same (Taylor, 1997). The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which succeeded UNIP, retained the decision-making process and accountability structure for Chiluba and his team. However, unlike in the previous regime under President Kaunda, MMD offered little across time and could not provide cross-sectional explanations change in Zambia’s foreign policy towards Southern African states (the Republic of Zambia, 1996). Nonetheless, the policies pursued by Chiluba through MMD reflected a change in the governing class. Although that could have been the case, the extent to which changes the ruling party influenced foreign policy preferences did not lead to significant restructuring in Zambia’s foreign policy outside economic diplomacy.

However, stability in Zambia’s foreign policy under Chiluba was not possible because the MMD support base did not emphasize control over access to economic power and influence rather than formal institutional characteristics (Tembo, 1996). Nonetheless, based on the identification of the MMD and various other interest groups which formed the political environments, it is possible to capture the specific foreign policy preferences of each and thus to predict a direction of change. The MMD support base held sway over foreign policymaking like UNIP previously did under Kaunda (Ibid, 1996). Since there was a change in the support base, it was likely that there were also more observable shifts in Zambia’s foreign policy. Despite the reintroduction of a multiparty system, Chiluba was more accountable to the party cadre, and because party elites were likely to share basic policy preferences over time, no changes in Zambia’s foreign policy for the duration of Chiluba’s MMD regime.

Other regional imperatives affected Chiluba’s foreign policy. In regional security, for instance, Chiluba pursued a different agenda. Chiluba deemed that Zambia needed to redirect its perception of regional security by supporting the SADC peace efforts in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola. To Chiluba, the DRC conflict was harmful and therefore a matter of a regional problem that Zambia needed to overcome by collaborating with the African Union (AU) and other states to find peace (Haantobolo, 2000). Although Chiluba provided direction for his government on regional security, the attitude on impending conflicts in DRC was not presented with a clear
direction, especially when his government formally proclaimed Zambia’s foreign policy statement in early 1996 (Republic of Zambia, 1996). Chiluba’s attitudes towards policy shift impacted less on Zambia’s foreign policy than the influence of an external condition, being the SADC and AU initiatives, largely (Schler, 2018).

After the war broke out in DRC, the AU peace efforts essentially pushed Chiluba and the Zambian government to be concerned about the increasing security ties between Zambia and the neighbouring countries (Taylor, 1997). The shift in Zambia’s regional security position resulted from the AU effort to prevent further escalation of the conflict. Zambia had shifted its position in international security from strictly neutral to extremely supportive of peace efforts. Chiluba officially visited the DRC capital Kinshasa in December 1998, and the Zambian government took its first action to find peace and stability in the DRC by offering troops, such as a military engineering battalion (Haantobolo, 2000). In addition, when Chiluba attended a SADC meeting in 1999 in Malawi, many SADC leaders hailed Zambia’s efforts in finding peace in the neighboring DRC. Chiluba used the opportunity of the SADC meeting to find a diplomatic solution to the DRC and Angola conflict.

Like his predecessor, the discourse on Zambia’s foreign policy during Levy Mwanawasa’s presidency had elements of Chiluba’s economic diplomacy. However, Mwanawasa’s view of international relations was slightly different. For example, Zambia’s stance on the conflict in Zimbabwe which he called a “sinking Titanic” at a time when most leaders sympathized with Robert Mugabe was quite unusual given Zambia’s long warm relations with that country dating back to the liberation struggle (BBC 2004). Domestic economic, political, and regional cleavages were the source of Mwanawasa’s pursuit of the ‘national interest’ and the fundamental determinant of state behavior in international relations (Chitonge, 2021). Indeed, these sectoral interests influenced Mwanawasa’s foreign policy. It can be argued that similar sectoral interests as under Chiluba held sway in Mwanawasa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa, although with slight modifications.

Economic interests were not the only source of different foreign policy preferences under Mwanawasa (Scott, 2019). Like under Chiluba, ethnicity, and race rarely played a role in Mwanawasa’s foreign policy. For example, when the white minority had political influence in South Africa and Rhodesia, Chiluba did not hesitate to engage in economic diplomacy with states repressing members of what seemed to have been the same racial group as majority Zambians. However, ideological divisions may also have affected Zambia’s general foreign policy orientation during Mwanawasa’s presidency. Consider the case of the economic neo-liberalization, which became part and parcel of Mwanawasa’s foreign policy.

We argue that Mwanawasa continued with the strategy regarding Zambia’s economy, due to the desire to restore the country’s economy that had greatly crumbled due to highly indebtedness under the Chiluba regime especially from western countries and the Bretton Woods institutions (The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund(Scott, 2019; Edwards, 2022). His policy action focused on improving the domestic situation through regional integration initiatives. Like his predecessor, President
Mwanawasa also developed economic ties with countries in the region aligning with the concept of neo-liberalization. We argue that Mwanawasa kept pursuing a strong attitude towards policy adaptation different from the Chiluba government’s initiative which was the idea behind the SADC region integration agenda throughout the region, as well as portraying the policy as economic-led regional strengths.

While international relations scholars have embraced the importance of domestic influences on Zambia’s foreign policy under Mwanawasa, much of the systematic work on this subject has emphasized the influence of the governing party at that time. During this period, the MMD as a governing party influenced the decision-making process. However, the policies pursued by Mwanawasa reflected a shorter-term change in the party hierarchy. Despite the prevalence of subjective and post hoc analysis that the MMD was crucially important in shaping Mwanawasa’s vision in foreign affairs, the extent to which changes in foreign policy reflected the ideological leaning of the MMD was not well established outside the economic policy arena.

However, the identification of the continuity of MMD as the source of support for Mwanawasa’s policy towards Southern Africa in the multiparty system is less challenging. The relative stability in foreign affairs was possible as the MMD support emphasized control over access to power and influence rather than formal institutional characteristics (Scott, 2019; Geddes, 1999; Edwards, 2022). As under Chiluba, the MMD support base held sway over policymaking, even under Mwanawasa and any possible change in foreign policy could have been affected. Since there was continuity in the support base, it was likely that there were also less observable shifts in Zambia’s foreign policy during Mwanawasa’s presidency.

Mwanawasa pursued a similar agenda on matters of regional and international security (Malupenga, 2009). Mwanawasa was rapidly employed while attempting to achieve the objectives under Chiluba’s foreign policy. It appears that Zambia had not shifted its position in international security from being extremely supportive of peace efforts. Furthermore, when the Zambian President attended a SADC leader’s meeting in 2005 many SADC leaders implored Zambia’s efforts in finding peace in the DRC. Some SADC members were concerned over their safety in Zambia just before the summit, due to the instability in DRC. Chiluba used the opportunity of the SADC meeting in Zambia to pursue his peace efforts agenda as widespread support from SADC leaders for Zambia’s diplomatic solution to the DRC and Angola conflict. Although, international imperative influenced Mwanawasa’s foreign policy, domestic political and economic cleavages were equally important.

Following Mwanawasa’s untimely death, Rupiah Banda was elected Zambia’s fourth President. Although he retained most of his predecessor’s foreign policy, Banda’s foreign policy differed from that of Mwanawasa, markedly. The discourse on Zambia’s foreign policy during Banda’s presidency usually turned to domestic politics only as an ad hoc explanation for Banda’s diplomatic engagement which appeared quite normal from the standpoint of regional politics (Malupenga, 2009). Unlike Mwanawasa, Banda was of did not take a hardline stance against Zimbabwe. It appears that sectoral interests did not have a bigger influence on Banda’s foreign policy, especially with Zimbabwe. However,
this flexibility allowed Banda to continue on the same privatization program left by his predecessor, where his support base preferred a multilateral internationalist strategy based on foreign investment and economic diplomacy (Chitonge, 2021).

It can be argued that economic interests were not the only source of different foreign policy preferences under Banda (Malupenga, 2009). Unlike Mwanawasa’s foreign policy, ethnicity and race played a role in Banda’s foreign policy as evidenced by the stance he took in support of the government of Zimbabwe. Banda’s foreign policy could largely be attributed to his background as a diplomat rather than to continuity in domestic sources of foreign policy. Having served as a diplomat during the UNIP era, it appears Banda was of the desire to restore Zambia’s Pan-African image following the row between Zambia and Zimbabwe during Mwanawasa’s time. His policy action focused on improving the domestic situation through foreign economic policy initiatives. Banda continued developing extensive economic ties with foreign countries in regional cooperation.

Therefore, Banda’s foreign policy succeeded in developing economic ties with neighbors to pursue a policy of good neighborliness and pursue foreign economic policy initiatives (Edwards, 2022). This sharp vision led to Banda’s aspiration of Pan-Africanist foreign policy and strengthening diplomatic relations in various dimensions. Banda also promoted trade and investment as a significant goal with neighboring countries. Whether domestic conditions were influential or not, leadership turnover and the Banda’s support base in MMD significantly influenced the instigation of the changes in international relations.

Like under Mwanawasa and Chiluba, the MMD defined the decision-making process in international relations. Despite the constraints presented by the MMD and other sectoral interests, Banda retained meaningful choices in international relations (Malupenga, 2009). Although these choices were influenced by the interests and preferences of societal groups that Banda and his government class represented, they, by and large, reflected his idea which was quite different from his predecessor as well the domestic institutional context in Zambia at that time. Most significant about Banda’s foreign policy was the manner he dealt with problematic regimes in the region, such as the crisis in Zimbabwe, which his predecessor was very critical of. It appears that the change source of support for Banda’s foreign policy in the multiparty system is less challenging. Nonetheless, based on the identification of the MMD and various other interest groups which formed the political environments in Zambia, the governing party formed a very critical support base for Banda which was crucial in shaping his foreign policy direction. Since there was a change in the support base, it was likely that there were also more observable shifts in Zambia’s foreign policy.

Sata, Lungu and the Patriotic Front

Zambia’s foreign policy after the 2011 elections can be characterized as ‘Michael Sata’s personalist foreign policy’, with many believing that the personality and leadership style played a crucial part in determining Zambia’s diplomacy (Ntomba, 2021; Scott, 2019). It appears that Sata had a high belief in his ability to control events, a low
conceptual complexity, and a high need for power (Alastair, 2017). Zambia’s foreign policy interest under Sata mirrored his behavior that appeared unusual undiplomatic at instances (Ntomba, 2019). However, economic interests did not significantly influence Sata’s foreign policy (Rupanyane & Shai, 2019). Although Sata had embarked on a nationalization program, this agenda did not reflect his desire to chart a new foreign policy different from previous rulers under the MMD.

We argue that economic sectors within the Zambian society that depended on the Patriotic Front preferred a foreign policy based on economic diplomacy just like previous governments (Mataka & Nzala, 2020; Scott, 2019) For instance, among the internationalist coalition were those economic actors who interacted mainly with other “core” states, such as China and the European Union (EU) preferred economic relations. These economic interests may have existed simultaneously and competed with one another for control of policy within Zambia. The result was that changes in economic policy when President Sata embarked on nationalization of capital resulted in changes in foreign policy.

It appears the Patriotic Front like the MMD had enormous influence in shaping foreign policy. By contrast, the policies pursued by Sata and through the Patriotic Front reflected a change in domestic political institutions, although the shift in foreign policy was not immediate as during the transition from UNIP to MMD in 1991. Like in the MMD era, the extent to which changes in the ruling party’s influence over policymaking restructuring was not well established under Sata. These choices were influenced by the interests and preferences of societal groups that Sata represented within the governing party and outside. During the period 2011 to 2014, Sata’s source of support for foreign policy agenda was associated with the governing class in the Patriotic Front.

The identification of the change’s source of support for Sata’s “Personalist” foreign policy towards Southern Africa is more challenging (Ntomba, 2021). However, change in foreign affairs was possible because the support for his “personalist foreign policy” emphasized control over access to power and influence rather than formal institutional characteristics. Nonetheless, based on the identification of the governing class within the Patriotic Front and various other interest groups which formed the political environments, it is not possible to capture the specific foreign policy preferences of each and thus to predict a direction of change.

In 2014 Sata died and Edgar Lungu was elected as Zambia’s sixth President. Although foreign policy under president Lungu has carried over the preferences of the previous president, he has exhibited his preferences. It appears Lungu is espoused to continue playing an active role in strengthening regional economic communities to boost intra-Africa trade and promote fair multilateral economic agreements at the global level (Edwards, 2022). However, a closer examination of this preference seems to show that the efforts are in reality an inward-looking strategy to benefit mainly party supporters through economic and debt diplomacy.

Understandably the national interest is to promote economic cooperation, trade, and investment but the heart of the policy appears to be the appeasement of local party supporters. This is evidenced in the manner in which foreign investment, aid, and loans
are primarily applied to support mainly party members by way of contracts or other forms of opportunities. Such a foreign policy approach is inadvertently undermining democracy, peace prospects, and stability by excluding sections of society from full participation. Already one of Lungu’s preferences, that of debt acquisition and debt diplomacy have had a damaging effect on Zambia’s image since the country recently failed to service its debt and now risks ceding some of its national assets to external lenders (Kanenga, 2017).

The argument that Lungu’s foreign policy is inward-looking is also demonstrated through his strategy that pursues active engagement with the majority of countries with a history of high-handed leaders such as Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda and Turkey among others. Partnerships are strategically entered into to enhance national security by way of aligning with regimes that are perceived to suppress and oppress opposition to their rule. This can be interpreted as furtherance of relations to learn and implement similar measures and concentrate power in the hands of one leader, who then can move swiftly without prior consultations, to take foreign policy positions and increase the state’s maneuverability.

A state’s domestic strength is a very important tool that helps in shaping the role that it plays in global politics (Fearon, 1998). More democratic, more developed, and more stable countries tend to advance their national interest – out of which emerge foreign policy positions – better. However, Zambia under president Lungu seems to slide towards more control, less development for all, and underlying instability signals. This scenario implies that domestic sources of foreign policy are negatively affecting the country on the international stage.

Since Lungu had no coherent political ideology of his own, he has contradicted himself frequently, covertly, or overtly but has felt it unnecessary to explain or justify his actions. At the moment Zambia’s foreign policy appears vague, contradictory, and tailored to benefit elites from the governing party. For example, the conflict that arises between pursuing a capitalist or socialist approach to issues has made it hard to pursue an assertive foreign policy (Burdette, 2021).

Indeed, Lungu’s preference for his political support base within the governing Patriotic Front, almost exclusively in managing national affairs had spurred festering ethnic, regional, and political rivalries which have motivated president Lungu to make his primary concern be his political survival and that of his party even in foreign relations (Scott, 2019; Edwards, 2022). We, therefore, argue that only secondarily has he been able to pursue a foreign policy intended for the broader benefit of all. As a consequence, this has led to the neglect of active foreign policy initiatives of the past. Allegations of registering foreign voters on the border with neighboring countries have not been settled since he ascended to power in 2015.

Hichilema and the UPND

Zambia held general elections in August 2021 and Hakainde Hichilema and the United Party for National Development (UPND) won a landslide victory over Lungu’s Patriotic Front. For a party that has been in opposition for over two decades, this signified
a significant shift in Zambia’s domestic and international relations (Ndambwa & Siwale, 2019). Hichilema’s foreign agenda is anchored on his quest to evoke the personality of stalwart global statesman and respected pan-Africanist, Kaunda. This was very important given his weak Pan-African credentials.

Hichilema’s foreign policy seems to continue from his predecessors in nurturing peace and security in the world (the Republic of Zambia, 2021). This is echoed in Hichilema’s promise to the UN General Assembly that he would take part in diplomatic negotiations aimed at bringing peace to the volatile region of CABO Delgado in Mozambique (Ndambwa & Siwale, 2021). The move to discuss terrorism openly was quite a new practice in Zambia’s engagement in the region (Anglin & Shaw, 2021). Previous leaders often refrained from discussing important diplomatic matters openly. We understand that efforts at fostering peace require huge diplomatic efforts that demand careful analysis especially since the causes of terrorist activities are numerous which could make Zambia a target if it crosses paths with the interests of terrorist insurgents. Rolling out such a diplomatic message with such sensitivity at this stage may jeopardize his efforts at bringing the belligerents in the neighboring country to the negotiating table. We fear that any diplomatic gaffe at this stage can turn out to be a serious indictment on his young presidency. Hichilema also pledged to continue driving the Pan-Africanist’s peace-building agenda not just for Mozambique but for the entire sub-region.

Although Hichilema’s administration has publicly proclaimed that it appreciates and considers all-powerful economies of the world to be strategic partners in revitalizing the crumbling Zambia’s economy and restructuring the debt the country owes external creditors, the behavior of Hichilema seems to be tilting towards the West. The President has made all international visits to the western countries and none to the Eastern countries like China, India, or Russia among others (Lusaka Times, 2021; Zambia Daily Mail, 23rd January, 2022).

Furthermore, contrary to the non-aligned position traditionally taken by his Predecessors, Hichilema’s government seems to be resolved to side with the western liberal democracies. This is evidenced in how the government voted in the UN general assembly about the Russia-Ukrainian War where the government of Zambia voted against Russia. This prompted the Deputy Russian Ambassador to Zambia to publicly register displeasure in the manner the government of Zambia voted. He said that while his government did not take offense in the manner the Zambian government voted, it expected a different vote from Zambia (News Diggers, 9th March 2022).

The governing party UPND like the Patriotic Front has continued to exert an enormous influence in shaping foreign policy. Like his predecessors, Hichilema has continued to rely on the party’s support base even in international affairs. This can be explained by the stance the party took after the Zambia vote on the Ukraine-Russia conflict at the special session of the UN General Assembly in early March 2022 (Sakala, 2022). This stance was expected given the overarching power governing parties have had in shaping policies pursued by the state and through them which also reflected a change in domestic political institutions.
Conclusion

As noted by other scholars, intellectual discourse on Zambia's foreign policy has traditionally been more successful at explaining foreign policy continuity rather than change. We believe that this is because most scholars (Momba, 2001; Shaw, 1979) have often focussed on the structure of regional politics in Southern Africa and basic state characteristics like power and geographic position. Given the relatively undisputable nature of these factors in international politics, they explain continuity well but fall short if the goal is to predict change in Zambia’s foreign policy. The basic argument of that we have tried to advance in this article is that if we would like to know policy change we should think about changes in domestic political processes. As noted by others (Mataka and Nzala, 2020; Fearon, 1998), the political changes that bring politicians into power with different societal support groups can be a powerful source of change in foreign policy. In the process, politicians that represent different interests and preferences than their predecessors, opt to pursue a distinct foreign policy course. However, the extent to which such changes in political support could also signal shifts in foreign policy and diplomatic engagement should also depend on the governing party allowing politicians greater leeway within the re-direction of international policy.

The empirical focus in this article shows that changes in domestic politics have not only been a frequently used measure of foreign policy change but it is also particularly useful for gauging the impact of governing parties on important issues in global and regional politics. As noted noted by others (Anglin & Shaw, 2021) politicians and governing parties have often been constrained by international law when it comes to changing policies enshrined in regional treaties, but there are no such constraints on foreign policy and diplomatic pronouncements. The implication is that Zambian politicians have had more leeway in changing positions in international politics. It also means that any continuity in foreign policy is likely to have been induced by domestic political institutions, such as political parties and the ideological orientation of the political elites, rather than international ones (Barton, 2016; Rapanyane and Shai, 2019). Using this measure of change in foreign policy and changes in leaders’ sources of domestic political support, the source of support changes are consistently a significant predictor of foreign policy change in a multiparty system but not in the one-party system.

However, the multiparty system also displays greater foreign policy consistency in the face of continuity in the source of leaders’ support than the one-party system. For instance, MMD as a going party under the leadership Chiluba, Mwanawasa and Banda, displayed greater continuity that change (Matakala and Nzala, 2020). Interestingly, though, it appears that the difference between the one party and multiparty is not as pronounced in this relatively unconstrained area of foreign policy although it should have owing to the fact that in multiparty politics in Zambia has produced political leaders that have tended to be supported by certain external interests especially those that support the financing of political parties and particular presidential candidates (Siwale, 2015; Siwale and Momba, 2020).
In addition, Zambia’s multiparty political system seems to be more responsive to shifting domestic preferences in areas of foreign policy that are subject to fewer domestic and international political constraints. As noted by others (Anglin & Shaw, 2021), democracies do display a greater foreign policy consistency than one-party systems. Therefore, politicians and governing parties in a multiparty political system such as Zambia may not face a dilemma between responsiveness to domestic interests and maintaining a stable foreign policy. This is why Zambian presidents after the reintroduction of multiparty politics, have tended to adopt foreign policies that reflect the preferences of the domestic as well as external interests especially those that are instrumental in funding the process of neoliberal political agenda in Africa (Siwale and Momba, 2020). The MMD for instance, was a government that started with massive IMF and other western donors’ support in the early 1990s, but in its final years in power under a different Mwanawasa and Banda, the party and government leaned more towards China and other east Asian powers. In the decate under the Patriotic Front from 2011 to 2021, Sata and Lungu seemed to have continued from the MMD and Banda’s outlook of international relations, leaning more to the East than to the West. With Hichilema’s UPND winning the 2021 general elections, Zambia has witnessed a complete turnout in foreign policy, leaning more to the West rather than the East as espoused by the previous administration.to the problem of research. Moreover, it can also be added to the development prospects of the research and the further application in subsequent studies.

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